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Judge May Not Answer Juror's Question as
to Defendant's Opportunity for Parole-De-
fendant was indicted for the crime of rape.
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury retired
to the jury room. Shortly thereafter, the
jury returned to the courtroom and, in the
presence of defendant's counsel, asked the
judge how long defendant would have to re-
main in prison before becoming eligible for
parole. In reply, the judge stated that de-
fendant would have to serve at least one-third
of his sentence. Counsel for defendant objected
to the judge's remarks, and thereupon the
judge instructed the jury not to consider
them. Defendant was convicted and sentenced
to life imprisonment. The Supreme Court of
Alabama reversed the conviction on the
grounds that the judge revealed information
to the jury which was not proper for them to
consider. Lawley v. State, 87 S.2d 433 (Ala.
1956).
The court surmised that the jury intended
to make sure that defendant served a certain
number of years in prison by adding to the
length of the sentence to compensate for the
possibility of parole. The reduction of a
sentence by a parole board, it was said, is not
a proper factor to be considered by the jury
and such information is of such a prejudicial
nature that, once revealed, a subsequent in-
struction by the judge to disregard the in-
formation is insufficient to correct the damage.
When a judge is confronted with such a ques-
tion, the court said, "The trial judge should
instruct the jury to impose such sentence as
seemed to be just with no regard to what
might happen to the sentence in the future."
Refusal To Allow Inspection Of Written
Confession By Defendant May Violate Four-
teenth Amendment-Shortly after his arrest
on a charge of murder, defendant allegedly
signed a written confession. Prior to trial in a
state court, defense counsel requested per-
mission to inspect a copy of defendant's
confession, claiming that the information
sought was essential for the proper prepara-
tion of the defense. The trial court granted
permission for inspection, but its order was
reversed by the Supreme Court of New Jersey.
State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881 (1953).
Thereafter, defendant again requested per-
mission to inspect and denied that he had
read the statement or that he had admitted
the crime. The second application was denied
and defendant proceeded to trial without
having had the opportunity to examine his
alleged confession.
During the course of the trial, defendant
objected to the admission into evidence of the
confession; the judge, according to New Jersey
practice, held a hearing outside of the presence
of the jury to determine the voluntariness of
the confession. Defendant was not furnished a
copy of the confession until after the judge
had ruled the statement voluntary and ad-
mitted it into evidence. Upon his conviction,
defendant initiated a habeas corpus proceed-
ing in a federal district court. The Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed the
denial by the district court of defendant's
petition. Application of Tune, 230 F.2d 883
(3rd Cir. 1956).
The circuit court agreed with the arguments
of defendant that denial of the privilege of
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inspection might well hamper the preparation
of the defense. However, the court concluded
that, "While refusal to give the defense a
copy of the confession may not be the better
practice, failure to do so will violate due
process only if prejudice can be shown."
Defendant failed to convince the court that
receipt of the confession would have altered
the course of the defense.
Greater difficulty, however, was experienced
by the court in disposing of the problems en-
countered by defendant in contesting the
voluntariness of the confession without having
had the opportunity to first examine it. An
important factor which must be considered by
the trial judge in ruling on the voluntariness
of the confession is the accuracy of the state-
ments contained therein. "The refusal of the
state to allow petitioner to inspect the con-
fession prior to the final ruling on voluntari-
ness effectively deprived petitioner of an
opportunity to inject the factor of the con-
fession's accuracy and truth into the trial on
the issue of voluntariness. That fact might
very well make a difference in a trial judge's
determination of that issue." Nevertheless,
the court decided that defendant was not
prejudiced in this regard because of the
absence of any indication that the accuracy
of the statement could have been challenged.
It was stated in a concurring opinion,
however, "that in other circumstances, a
grave due process question may arise out of
the very unsatisfactory practice of deciding
upon the admissibility of an alleged confession
without first revealing its contents to the
defendant and affording him a reasonable
opportunity to use the text itself in support
of his claim of coercion."
Voluntary Character of a Confession Must
Be Determined in Illinois by The Court Out-
side the Presence of the Jury-Defendant was
indicted on a charge of murder. The only
direct evidence introduced at the trial con-
necting defendant with the homicide was a
pre-trial confession obtained from defendant
by police. Defendant objected to admission of
the confession, contending that it was ex-
tracted from him by coercion, promises of
leniency, and, in addition, that no proper
foundation for its admission had been laid.
The trial court overruled all objections and
admitted the confession without a preliminary
voir dire hearing outside the presence of the
jury. The Supreme Court of Illinois reversed
defendant's conviction and remanded the
cause for a new trial on the ground that the
trial court failed to follow the proper proce-
dure in admitting the confession into evi-
dence. People v. Wagoner, 133 N.E.2d 24 (Ill.
1956).
The court maintained that "confessions are
competent evidence only when they are
voluntarily made... if an objection is made
[to the admissibility of a confession], it is the
duty of the court to hear, out of the presence
of the jury, such evidence as the parties may
present concerning the circumstances under
which the confession was made, for the pur-
pose of determining whether it was volun-
tarily made or was procured by pressure,
fraud, hope, fear or other. undue influence
S.. Such preliminary hearing pertains to the
conpetency of the confession which must
first be determined by the court. It can never
be properly left to the jury." The court in-
dicated that at the preliminary hearing, the
prosecution must produce all witnesses to the
interrogation and the defendant should testify
and advise the court as to what took place
during the questioning.
In a recent case, the conclusive deter-
mination by the trial judge of the voluntari-
ness of a confession was held not to violate
the Fourteenth Amendment. Application of
Tune, 230 F.2d 883 (3rd Cir. 1956).
Prosecution May Determine Whether to
Charge a Violation of Internal Revenue Code
as a Felony or Misdemeanor-Petitioner was
indicted for willfully attempting to evade
federal income taxes by filing with the Col-
lector "false and fraudulent" tax returns.
This offense is punishable under either of two
sections of the Internal Revenue Code of 1939,
26 U.S.C. Section 3616(a) provides that any
person who delivers to the Collector a false
19561
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and fraudulent tax return is guilty of a mis-
demeanor and subject to a $1,000 fine and one
year of imprisonment. Defendants were in-
dicted under section 145(b) which provides
that "any person who willfully attempts in
any manner to evade or defeat any tax...
shall be guilty of a felony ... and shall be
fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned
more than five years or both.. ."
The trial judge refused the petitioner's
request that the jury be instructed to decide
whether petitioner was guilty of a felony or a
misdemeanor. The United States Supreme
Court, in a 6-3 decision, affirmed the trial
judge's refusal of the instruction saying that
"here, whether §145(b) or §3616(a) be deemed
to govern, the factual issues to be submitted
to the jury were the same;... When the jury
resolved those issues against the petitioner,
its function was exhausted, since there is
here no statutory provision giving to the jury
the right to determine punishment to be
imposed after the determination of guilt."
Berra v. United States, 76 S.Ct. 685 (1956).
Mr. Justice Black, speaking for the dissent,
said that "filing a fraudulent return could be
proscribed by §145(b) because of the phrase
'in any manner', but the offense certainly
falls within §3616(a) which expressly sets
forth the punishment for filing fraudulent
returns." Justice Black contends that the
majority decision permits the prosecuting
attorneys of the government to elect the
punishment to be imposed. Mr. Justice
Black said, "I think we should construe these
sections so as not to place control over the
liberty of citizens in the unreviewable discre-
tion of one individual ... it is true that under
our system Congress may vest the judge and
jury with broad power to say how much
punishment shall be imposed for a particular
offense. But it is quite different to vest such
powers in a prosecuting attorney." A judge
and jury reach their judgments and verdicts
at public trial in which the defendant has a
right to be represented by an attorney. "No
such protection is thrown around the decisions
by a prosecuting attorney."
Trial of Conscientious Objectors for Failure
to Obey Draft Boards' Order Must Take Place
where Order Is to Be Performed, Not where
Draft Boards Are Located-Defendants were
conscientious objectors who had been indicted
for violations of the Universal Military Train-
ing and Service Act, 50 U.S.C. Appendix
§451st seq. They had reported to their local
draft boards but subsequently refused to
report for work in state hospitals as ordered.
The state hospitals were located in judicial
districts different from those of defendants'
local draft boards. Defendants were brought
to trial in the judicial district where the
hospitals were located. The Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit reversed the trial court's
dismissal of the charge for improper venue
and remanded the case for trial. The United
States Supreme Court, in a 6-2 decision,
affirmed the ruling of the Court of Appeals
and held that proper venue existed in the
judicial district where defendants refused to
report for work. Mr. Justice Reed, speaking
for the majority, said ". . . the law and the
facts in these cases convinces us that the
venue of these violations of the orders lies in
the district where the civilian work was to
be performed. . ." Johnston v. United States,
76 S.Ct. 739 (1956).
The basis of this conclusion was "the
general rule that where the crime charged is a
failure to do a legally required act, the place
fixed for its performance is the situs of the
crime." The court construed the facts in this
case as placing two duties on the defendants:
1) to report to their local draft boards, which
duty was performed; and 2) to report to the
hospitals, which was not done. Trial was to
take place in the state and district where the
crime was committed, i.e., where defendants
failed to report for work.
In a dissenting opinion, Justices Douglas,
Black and Chief Justice Warren construed the
crime to be the failure of the defendants to
obey any order of their local draft boards
and, thus, held venue proper in the judicial
districts of the defendants' local draft boards.
The dissenting justices believe that the de-
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fendants should be given the benefit of trial
in their home towns. "For their defiance of
their local boards they are sent to distant
places for trial where they have no friends,
where they are unknown, and to which all
witnesses must be transported . . . I would
read the statute with an eye to history and
try the offenders at home where our fore-
fathers thought that normally men would
receive the fairest trial."
Husband-Wife Privilege Is Waived when
Husband Directs Police to Question Wife-
Defendant was arrested for the murder of his
wife's lover. When asked by police to make a
statement, defendant replied, "Ask my wife."
His wife was then questioned in defendant's
presence and stated in a typewritten state-
ment that defendant had admitted to her that
he had committed the murder.
At the trial defendant objected to the ad-
mission as evidence of his wife's signed state-
ment, claiming that his statement to his wife
about his part in the homicide was a privileged
communication between husband and wife.
The Indiana Supreme Court affirmed defend-
ant's conviction and approved the admission
of the wife's statement on the grounds that
defendant had waived his privilege by in-
structing the police officers to question his
wife. Hunt v. State, 133 N.E.2d 48 (Ind.
1956).
The court concluded that "Where a party
directs another to a third person for informa-
tion or directions, he is bound by the state-
ments of the third persons . . . Since the
[husband-wife privilege] does not create any
absolute incompetency but only a privilege,
it necessarily follows that the privilege may be
waived. The appellant waived the privilege
when he told the police officers several times
to ask his wife."
(For other recent case abstracts see "Police Science Legal Abstracts and Notes", infra pp. 392-394)
1956]
